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This paper uses unique German data to examine the eects of the relative standing
on the individual propensity to become self-employed in the next two years. The
results suggest that the relationship between relative wage positions and propensity
to become self-employed is U-shaped. This is interpreted as evidence that low status
translates into entrepreneurial motivation for workers in low relative wage positions.
Employees with high relative standing, in turn, seem to be more concerned about
the lack of future career prospects in paid employment and consider self-employment
as a next step on the individual career ladder.
JEL-Classication: L26, L29
Keywords: Relative wage position, status, self-employment
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Magnitudes of papers have examined the outcomes of self-employment with a special focus
on monetary rewards. Individual utility, however, is not solely determined by pecuniary
aspects. In fact, the results presented in Hamilton (2000) suggest that there are substantial
nonpecuniary benets of self-employment. Benz and Frey (2008) described that individuals
derive utility from independence in self-employment. Ryan and Deci (2000) showed that
self-determination can be characterized by the degree of autonomy, individual competence,
and need to be respected within social groups. This paper contributes to the question of
how individual prestige in paid employment aects the decision to become self-employed.
The own relative standing and income comparisons have reached attendance in studies on
interdependent preferences and subjective well-being (see, e.g., Hamermesh, 1975; Frank,
1985; Easterlin, 1995; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Clark et al., 2008) as well as in papers on
economic behavior (see, e.g., Pfeifer, 2010).
Card et al. (2010) analyzed the impact of relative standing on satisfaction with the job
and the probability of looking for a new job.1 Pfeifer and Schneck (2011, 2012) argued
that job mobility is negatively correlated with individual utility and showed that direct
mobility between establishments is aected by relative wage positions. As self-employment
can be viewed as an alternative to mobility between jobs, similar arguments are expected
to hold for the propensity to become self-employed in the near future. Growing number of
studies on nascent entrepreneurship which aim to improve the understanding of individual
start-up eorts (Davidsson, 2006) are revealing the importance of this particular strand in
the literature. Although status is considered to be an important factor in entrepreneurial
motivation (Carsrud and Br annback, 2011), the literature lacks an analysis of how current
relative standing in paid employment aects individual start-up eorts. This paper lls
the gap by analyzing the relationship between relative wage positions in paid employment
1The authors also provide a more comprehensive survey of the literature on relative pay comparisons.
1and the motivation to become self-employed.
Using unique German panel data, this study has contributed empirical ndings to the
eects of comparison income on the propensity to become self-employment among German
males aged between 19 and 55 years. The sample comprised 7,211 observations on 4,308
blue- and white-collar workers in the periods 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009.
A signicant U-shaped eect with respect to the relative wage position was found to be
evident. In the context of the literature on relative wage positions, this can be explained in
the way in which workers at the bottom of the wage distribution have concerns about their
low status, and therefore, are planning to become self-employed. Workers in high positions,
in turn, suer few career advancement opportunities at the current employer and might
consider self-employment as a possibility to improve their own career. This explanation
approach, which basically relies on individual utility, is supported by the nding that an
inverse U-shaped relationship is evident when utilizing job satisfaction as the dependent
variable. For this reason, the analysis also shows that the assumptions of Pfeifer and
Schneck (2011) are reasonable in the context of self-employment.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the main hypotheses are introduced
and the theoretical background is discussed. Section 3 describes the data set and the
imposed restrictions. Section 4 presents and interprets the empirical ndings, while Section
5 provides the conclusion.
2 Theoretical Background and hypotheses
Standard economic literature explains that individual utility is mainly determined by abso-
lute wages, whereas increasing wages increase individual utility. This paper, however, refers
to relative wage positions that rely on income comparisons with an individually dened
reference group. Other peoples' income is a remarkably important determinant in studies
2on subjective well-being (Clark et al., 2008). If the own wage is held constant, lower wages
of comparable individuals might increase individual utility because it allows for downward
comparisons which might be perceived as of high status (status eect). Among a bulk of
studies, Clark et al. (2008) corroborated that higher relative wage positions increase the
well-being. However, the relative wage position can also provide information about own
future prospects (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973; Clark et al., 2008; Card et al., 2010).
In other words, the higher the relative wage position is, the lower is the future advance-
ment opportunities, because one is already high up in the pay scale. Higher comparison
income, thus, might reduce individual utility if the individual obtains utility from career
advancement opportunities. The literature refers to this kind of upward comparison as
the signal eect, because other individuals provide a signal about the own fortune in the
future. For a more detailed discussion on the status and signal eect, one can refer to
Clark et al. (2009), in which the authors also present evidence in favor of the signal eect.
This analysis aims to describe whether good fortune of the reference group introduces
jealousy (status eect) or increases individual utility by signaling bright future career
prospects (signal eect). Note that status eect and signal eect are contradictory, because
workers in high relative wage positions have high status, but few career advancement
opportunities. For workers in low relative wage positions, the reverse is true. Most studies
only refer to the average eect of the relative standing in the considered samples which
allows to conclude about whether, on average, the status eect or the signal eect is
dominant. As the eects of relative wage positions on the start-up eort are ambiguous,
this paper contributes an analysis of the eect of relative wage positions on the propensity
to become self-employed. The paper also goes beyond the scope of most of the studies
because of the specially focus on individuals in very low and very high relative positions.
This is important because individuals with lowest relative standing are not able to obtain
any utility from status while those in the highest positions do not obtain utility from
3signal. For this reason, the paper analyzes whether status or signal are more important in
these positions. So far, most of the studies refer to linear eects, which, however, might
be misinterpreted if one group obtains utility primarily from status and another group
accumulates utility basically from signal within the sample. Thus, the linear eects only
indicate which of the eects, on average, are dominant in the whole sample, and do not
refer to possible heterogeneity within the sample.
In order to address the consideration above as well as the established literature on the
eects of relative wage positions, two main hypotheses are derived which basically rely
on an inverse relationship between the propensity to become self-employed and individual
utility. The nonlinear relationship in hypothesis 2 allows for the possibility that workers
at the top and workers at the bottom evaluate the status eect and the signal eect in a
dierent manner.
1. Linear eects:
(a) Are workers in high relative wage positions more satised because of high status
and, as a consequence, less concerned about future self-employment? In this
case, the status eect dominates the signal eect.
(b) Are workers in high relative wage positions less satised because of low future
career prospects? Then, workers with high standing are more engaged in be-
coming self-employed. The signal eect, then, dominates the status eect.
2. Nonlinear eects:
(a) Is the relationship between relative wage positions and the propensity to become
self-employed U-shaped? In this case, workers with low relative standing are
more concerned about status, and thus consider self-employment as an exit
from low status, while workers in high relative wage positions suer few career
prospects that outweigh the high status of these workers.
4(b) Is the propensity to become self-employed in the near future inversely U-shaped
with respect to the relative wage position? This would imply that workers in
low relative wage positions are less concerned about self-employment because of
greater career prospects, while workers in high relative positions are less engaged
to become self-employed because of their high status.
So far, the paper has only addressed the aspect of prestige within social groups, and has
not referred to the remaining determinants of self-determination as cited by Ryan and Deci
(2000). The present study accounts for the individual competence by examination of dif-
ferent hierarchical levels of workers. Workers with allowance for guidance, however, might
be less concerned about self-employment because of the permission to control coworkers,
although it is reasonable to expect that even workers at the highest hierarchical levels are
subject to instructions and are not completely self-determined in rms. This eect might be
counteracted by an opposing human capital eect. Specically, workers in high hierarchical
positions are usually familiar with managerial tasks, and acquire competence about leading
departments or whole companies, which subsequently alleviates self-employment. Individ-
ual autonomy is, to some extent, addressed by the size of the rm, because Wagner (1997)
had showed that employees in smaller rms tend to have lower institutional possibilities
to participate in the decision making process. Less participation also restricts individual
autonomy within a rm. Larger rms, in turn, are characterized by a more decentralized
process of decision making, which allows for more individual autonomy. Entrepreneurship,
moreover, is accompanied by opportunity costs of being self-employed, when compared
with being employed (Amit et al., 1995). Such eects are accounted for by inclusion of the
current wage. Controlling for the absolute wage also accounts for the eect that absolute
compensation also contributes to individual's utility.
53 Data and methodology
The analysis of relative wage positions and self-employment is at the early stages of develop-
ment, because it is problematic to nd any data that contain information on entrepreneurial
motivation, individual reference groups, and individual wages. The Gr underpanel of the
Institute for Small Business Research in Bonn (Kranzusch and Kay, 2011) or the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor data (Brixy et al., 2011) lack detailed information on individual
wages.2 Matched employer-employee data, such as the linked employer-employee data set
of the Institute for Employment Research(Jacobebbinghaus, 2008), include direct informa-
tion on colleagues as reference group and wages, but lack information on the start-up eort.
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP; see Wagner et al., 2007) has been utilized in
this study because it contains wage-related information, questions on the intension to be-
come self-employed, and job-specic characteristics, which have been applied to generate
comparison groups. As a result, the data allowed for the analysis of the eects of relative
wage positions in the decision process of becoming self-employed.
The underlying data set only focuses on male German citizens in blue- and white-collar
jobs. The study on males is reasoned by the fact that income comparisons seem to be more
important for the subjective well-being of males, when compared with females (Mayraz
et al., 2009). In addition, labor market participation issues are reduced when only focusing
on males. The data have been further restricted to individuals between 19 and 55 years
of age. The upper bound is reasoned in the short amortization period of self-employment
for older individuals. As a consequence, older individuals might be more concerned about
(early) retirement than about self-employment. The lower bound has been chosen because
schooling degrees are usually achieved at this age. For information related to individual
wages, the SOEP questionnaire has been employed, which asks respondents about their
2Both data sets include questions on the household income or wages, respectively. The variables,
however, are categorized and therefore not adequate for the analysis of relative wage positions.
6monthly earnings from work in the last month. It must be noted that this study has only
focused on workers with a gross wage of at least 400 Euro in the last month.3
The variable of main interest in this study refers to the future self-employment. The
original question in the wave 2003 is as follows: How likely is it that the following career
changes will take place in your life within the next two years?
{ have become self-employed and/or freelance, and/or self-employed professional?
Subsequently, the respondents have to reply based on an eleven-item ordinal scale ranging
from zero (denitely not) to 100 (denitely). Note that this question was included in the
SOEP questionnaire in the waves 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009. In the consec-
utive analysis, this variable has been used as the indicator for the intension to become
self-employed and as the dependent variable.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The following brief descriptive part is to introduce the underlying data. First, dummy
variables were assigned to individuals who indicated aliation to a particular wage quintile
in year t. Figure 1 illustrates that the highest wage earners (in wage quintiles four and ve)
have the highest motivation to become self-employed, followed by the workers with lowest
wages (in wage quintiles one and two). The Figure demonstrates a U-shaped relationship
with respect to the relative wage position, and therefore, is in line with hypothesis 2a. On
an average, the smallest start-up eort has been observed in wage quintile three. However,
3Original question (changes slightly over time): How high were your earnings from work last month?
Do not include any special payments you may have received last month such as vacation bonuses or back
pay, but do include pay for overtime. If possible, please give both: your gross earnings, i.e., your pay
before taxes and social contributions are taken out; and your net earnings, i.e., the amount you receive
after taxes and contributions for pension plan, unemployment and health insurance. The consumer price
index surveyed by the Sachverst andigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage is applied to
deate the nominal wages (ZR 084; 2005 = 100). Wages in 1999 and 2001 are divided by 1.95583 because
the questionnaire refers to wages in DM instead of Euro.
7it must be noted that the intention to become self-employed is very small in the sample.
The average propensity to become self-employed in the data is 8.93 (see Table 4), and thus,
the clear tendency towards not becoming self-employed at all is evident.
Literature on wage comparisons suggests that individuals compare themselves most
likely with colleagues (Clark and Senik, 2010) who are not identiable in the data. Mayraz
et al. (2009) also utilized the SOEP and showed that individual comparisons within profes-
sions are important. Based on this nding, in the present study, it has been assumed that
workers compare themselves to workers with similar tasks. This reference group is, how-
ever, a very crude one. Table 1 shows the denition of low, medium, and high positions
account for hierarchical dierences and professional tasks. Based on these hierarchical
positions, measures indicating the relative wage position of individual i in period t by
hierarchical position pos have been generated.
Insert Table 1 about here
Self-determination might also be aected by the rm size. Wagner (1997) showed that
smaller rms tend to have a more centralized decision making process, when compared
with large companies. This reduces autonomy considerably and might increase the start-
up eort of workers, especially in smaller rms. Therefore, four categories indicating the
workforce have been dened, which are assumed to characterize rm-specic dierences.
A detailed description of these categories is presented in Table 2. Accordingly, this infor-
mation has been used to dene the relative wage positions of worker i in period t, position
pos, and rm with workforce fsize.4
Insert Table 2 about here
4This categorization allows for enough wage variation within groups. Only 71 observations are available
for workers in low hierarchical positions employed in companies with more than 2000 workers. Most
observations (834) are on individuals in medium hierarchical positions working in rms with more than
20 and less than 200 employees. Separation by sector would not allow for any wage variation in some
industries which is the main reason for applying rm size instead of sectors. Low observations by federal
regions (Bundesl ander) induces similar problems.
8Table 3 describes the measures for the relative wage position of individual i in wave t
which have been applied in the following multivariate analysis. The measures for the
relative wage positions have been dened in analogy to Pfeifer and Schneck (2012) and
Brown et al. (2008). The main dierence is that the rank accounts for the ordinal distance
across workers, while the range accounts for the cardinal wage dierence between worker
i in period t and the lowest wage earner in period t. That is, workers are sorted in an
ascending series in accordance to their absolute wages. While the rank only takes account
of the position, the range also considers wage dierentials across individuals in Euro. As the
measures for the relative standing might be aected by the sheer number of observations
and outliers in period t, respectively, both variables have been normalized to lie within
the unit interval. However, individuals in rank (range) zero have been observed to have
the lowest relative standing in period t, while employees in rank (range) one occupy the
highest relative wage position. Note that workers may not know the exact wages of other
workers: "All we can say is that people act as though they are able to form a reasonable
estimate of where, as individuals, they lie in the pay ordering and the range" (Brown et al.,
2008, p. 379).
Insert Table 3 about here
To consider the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, ordered probit estimation was con-
ducted to conclude about the eects of the relative standing. The prevalence of individual-
specic eects was tested by the application of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test
(Breusch and Pagan, 1979), which is based on linear regression models, instead of ordered
probit models. The null hypothesis of no individual heterogeneity was rejected at the 1
percent level for all specications. For this reason, unobserved heterogeneity was controlled
for by application of the random-eects ordered probit estimator (Greene, 2011, Chapter
18). A large set of control variables was included to control for age, individual human
capital (tenure, educational degrees), labor market status (dummy variable for blue-collar
9workers), part-time work (dummy variables for working hours), unemployment, marital
status, annual eects, and regional eects. As already discussed earlier, opportunity costs
of self-employment were accounted for by the current wage. To account for the dierent
levels of autonomy in paid employment, the eects for dierent sizes of companies were
controlled for. Individual competence was modeled by dummy variables for dierent hier-
archical positions. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in
the multivariate analysis by hierarchical positions.
Insert Table 4 about here
4 Results
This section consists of two parts. The rst part describes how relative wage positions aect
intensions to become self-employed while the second part examines the eect of relative
wage positions on satisfaction with the job. Table 5 refers to the linear eects mentioned
in Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Although statistically insignicant, all specications presented a
negative coecient for the rank and range measures, which can be interpreted in the way
that higher relative wage positions lower the propensity to quit a job for self-employment
in the near future. The results, thus, are in favor of Hypothesis 1a, where the status eect
is the predominant one. Higher relative standing introduces satisfaction because of high
status, which, then, is expected to decrease the propensity to become self-employed in the
near future.
The dummy variables for low and medium positions were negative, but not signicant in
all specications. This implies that workers in low and medium positions are less likely to
become self-employed in the near future, when compared with workers in high hierarchical
positions with allowance for guidance and managerial tasks. On the one hand, this can
be explained with human capital, because already obtained managerial skills are expected
10to alleviate self-employment. On the other hand, workers also might seek for even more
competence in the sense of controlling the environment, although workers in high positions
already have allowance for guidance. The coecients for the size of the rm, which are
used as proxy for autonomy, revealed that workers in smaller rms exhibit higher eort
to become self-employed than those in large companies with more than 2,000 workers.5
This shows that less autonomy increases considerations about self-employment. Basically,
the results are in line with Benz and Frey (2008) who discuss the importance of individual
independence in self-employment. With respect to the components of self-determination in
Ryan and Deci (2000) this implies that workers consider self-employment as an exit of low
perceived autonomy, of subjectively underrated individual competence, and of low status
within social groups. The eect of observed wages of individual i in period t was found
to be positive and statistically signicant in specications (1) and (4). Opportunity costs,
however, might play a minor role in planning self-employment which is also supported by
the statistical insignicance in specications (2) and (3).
Insert Table 5 about here
The analysis of possible nonlinearities, presented in Table 6 revealed a more distinctive
picture, when compared with those presented in Table 5. The quadratic specications
adverted to a U-shaped relationship between relative wage positions and the propensity
to become self-employed, which translated into an insignicantly negative eect in the
linear specications. Note that the log likelihood of the nonlinear models are slightly
smaller in absolute values, indicating that these models t the data better. The eects
of competence (positional dummy variables), autonomy (workforce dummy variables), and
5Note that, according to Boden (1996), employees of small rms were more likely to switch to self-
employment than employees of large rms, which might be indicative of (indirect) entrepreneurial learning.
In this line, Storey (1994) argued that presumably larger rms oer fewer entrepreneurial role models.
However, this negative relationship between the size of the rm and probability of switching into self-
employment might also reect more favorable working conditions in larger rms in terms of earnings and
security to keep the job.
11wit were relatively robust, when compared with those presented in Table 5. An exception
is the estimated coecient for workers in low positions because this eect was positive in
specication (1) of Table 6 and negative in specication (1) of Table 5. In addition, the
coecients for wit were statistically signicant in all specication of Table 6.
Insert Table 6 about here
With regard to the eects of the relative wage positions, the results suggest a signicant
U-shaped relationship. The results, thus, are in line with Hypothesis 2a. Workers in low
relative wage positions are found to be more concerned about their low status, which, in
turn, increases the likelihood of self-employment. Employees with high relative standing
seem to be more concerned about the lack of future career prospects in paid employment
and consider self-employment as a next step on the individual career ladder. The corre-
sponding minimum values of the presented specications in Table 6 are 0.73 (rankit;pos),
0.62 (rankit;pos;fsize), 0.73 (rangeit;pos), and 0.60 (rangeit;pos;fsize). This implies that workers
who are able to conduct downward comparisons (more than half of the workers have lower
relative standing) and, in addition, have some career advancement opportunities (there is
still a considerable share of workers in higher positions) exhibit the lowest start-up eort.
In sum, the results show that lower autonomy and more centralized decision making
processes in smaller rms increase individual start-up eort. Competence, the second
major determinant of self-determination mentioned by Ryan and Deci (2000), is shown
to aect entrepreneurial motivation such that workers with managerial tasks even try to
obtain more control via self-employment. This result is also in line with the hypothesis
that managerial tasks and the allowance for guidance in paid employment alleviate self-
employment. The main focus of this study is on the analysis of how relative wage positions
aect the propensity to become self-employed. The insignicant evidence in favor of a
linear status eect stems from a more distinctive relationship because it has been shown
that both status as well as signal matter when planning to become self-employed. Precisely,
12the nonlinear specications show that workers in middle wage position are less concerned
about self-employment, while those in high and low positions exhibit higher start-up eort.
The results, thus, are in line with Hypothesis 2a.
The U-shaped relationship between start-up eort and relative wage positions is in
line with the one reported in the study of Pfeifer and Schneck (2011) that analyzed direct
mobility between establishments. The authors argued that mobility is negatively correlated
with individual utility and stated that individuals obtain utility from both status as well
as signal. The explanation approach in this paper is based on the similar argument that
the propensity to become self-employed stems from low utility (dissatisfaction) with the
current job and, thus, is an inverse measure for utility. The SOEP has included information
on satisfaction with the job, which is frequently used as proxy for individual utility, because
Freeman (1978) showed its importance as an economic variable. The data, thus, is adequate
to examine whether the assumption of an inverse relationship between the propensity to
become self-employed and utility is a reasonable one.6
When using the propensity to become self-employed in the near future as an inverse
indicator for satisfaction with the job, workers in the middle relative wage positions (rang-
ing from 0.60 to 0.73) should be most satised with their jobs. As argued earlier, workers
at the bottom of the wage distribution might be concerned about their relative standing,
which, then, might introduce dissatisfaction (i.e., low utility) with the current job. The
lack of career advancement opportunities, in turn, might translate into low satisfaction
with the job for workers at the top of the wage distribution. Subsequently, random-eects
ordered probit estimation was conducted where individual satisfaction with the job was
utilized as the dependent variable to prove the validity of these hypotheses. Note that 40
6In the SOEP questionnaire, individuals are asked to report their job satisfaction in each year. Satis-
faction with the job, then is rated on a scale from 0 (low) to 10 (high). The original question in 1999 is:
How satised are you today with the following areas of your life? Please answer by using the following
scale: 0 means totally unhappy and 10 means totally happy. How satised are you with (if employed) your
job?
13observations have were dropped from the analysis because of non-response. The Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange multiplier test adverted to individual eects at the 1 percent level. Hence,
individual random-eects ordered probit estimation was applied.
Insert Table 7 about here
The results for the linear eects of the relative wage positions are presented in Specications
(1) to (4) in Table 7. The estimated coecients were non-robust across specications
because Specication (3) describes that workers in higher positions are less satised with
their jobs. This is in favor of the signal eect, but should not be overemphasized because
of the statistical insignicance. Specications (1), (2), and (4) exhibit positive coecients
for the relative wage position, which is in favor of the status eect. Workers in higher
relative positions seem to be more satised with their jobs. According to Specications (4)
to (8), presented in Table A.3, an inverse U-shaped eect is shown for the relative wage
positions. This result supports the main assumption that the start-up eort is likely to
be an inverse measure for satisfaction with the job. Note that, the eect of rangeit;pos is
not statistically signicant, whereas range2
it;pos is signicant in Specication (7). ). To
answer the hypothesis that the most satised workers could be found in the relative wage
positions within 0.60 and 0.73, the corresponding maximum values of measures for the
relative standing were calculated. The corresponding eects of rankit;pos, rankit;pos;fsize,
rangeit;pos, and rangeit;pos;fsize reveal maximums at 0.61, 0.65, 0.58, and 0.84, respectively.
Thus, the explanation that workers who are most satised with the job are less likely
to plan self-employment is supported. Furthermore, the assumptions used to derive the
hypotheses, which basically rely on satisfaction with the job, are found to be reasonable.
Finally, Table 7 allows to discuss the results of Benz and Frey (2008) with respect to
the determinants of self-determination presented in Ryan and Deci (2000). With respect to
the need to be respected within social groups, the measures for the relative wage positions
adverted to complex eects because workers with very low relative standing and workers
14in very high relative positions obtain lower utility in the job than workers who are able to
conduct upward as well as downward comparisons. The eect of the degree of autonomy
did not reveal any distinctive relationship with job satisfaction. Individual competence,
which is approximated by hierarchical positions, showed that workers without allowance for
guidance were signicantly less satised when compared with those performing managerial
tasks. Lastly, it is to note that the absolute wage was positive in all of the presented spec-
ications, but was, in terms of statistical signicance, of more importance in the equations
with job satisfaction as dependent variable.
5 Conclusion
This study employed unique German data to examine the eect of relative wage positions
on the propensity to become self-employed in the next two years. It has been found that
workers in middle relative wage positions are less likely to become self-employed, when
compared with those in high and low relative wage positions. However, the reverse can be
observed when using satisfaction with the job as the dependent variable. This contradictory
result allows for an explanation with respect to individual utility. Precisely, workers in
low positions have concerns about their status, which reduces utility and increases the
likelihood of self-employment. Employees with high relative standing, in turn, lack career
advancement opportunities, which reduce utility and increase start-up eort.
To conclude, this paper enhances the literature about the early stages of self-employment
in a considerable way because it contributes empirical ndings to the question of whether
and how comparison income matters in planning future self-employment. The main results
of this study are that the status eect as well as signal eect are evident when deciding
to become self-employed in the near future. Further research, however, is needed to con-
clude whether these eects are observable in other countries. Recently, Atolia and Prasad
15(2011) nd that preferences for status increase self-employment because preferences for
relative wealth lead to the willingness to take risks. An empirical analysis on the rela-
tionship between risk-taking and relative wage positions, thus, might contribute additional
improvements in understanding individual start-up eorts. A further promising eld of
research is the analysis of how comparison income aects realized self-employment.
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Number of observations 634 4,169 2,408
21Table 2: Workforce classications.
Firm size 1 2 3 4
Workforceit < 20 [20; 200[ [199; 2000[  2000
Number of observations 1,571 2,213 1,665 1,762
22Table 3: Absolute wage and denition of variables for relative wage position.
By position By position and workforce
(see Table 1) (see Tables 1 and 2)
wit ln(gross earnings from work last month)it Log of gross wage of







t;pos;fsize 1 Rank of worker i in
period t. Average
ranks are calculated













Range of worker i in t
23Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
Propensity to become self-employedit 8.925 18.426 0 100
rankit;pos 0.500 0.289 0 1
rank2
it;pos 0.334 0.299 0 1
rankit;pos;fsize 0.500 0.292 0 1
rank2
it;pos;fsize 0.335 0.302 0 1
rangeit;pos 0.576 0.150 0 1
range2
it;pos 0.345 0.167 0 1
rangeit;pos;fsize 0.572 0.181 0 1
range2
it;pos;fsize 0.360 0.200 0 1
Low positionit 0.0879 0.283 0 1
Medium positionit 0.578 0.494 0 1
High positionit 0.334 0.472 0 1
wit 7.818 0.493 5.991 9.865
Workforceit < 20 0.218 0.413 0 1
Workforceit 2 [20; 200[ 0.307 0.461 0 1
Workforceit 2 [200; 2000[ 0.231 0.421 0 1
Workforceit  2000 0.244 0.430 0 1
Tenureit 8.664 8.881 0 40.500
Tenure2
it 153.936 256.310 0 1640.250
Ageit 39.084 9.275 19 55
Age2
it 1613.599 715.804 361 3025
ISCED1it 0.00680 0.0822 0 1
ISCED2it 0.0618 0.241 0 1
ISCED3it 0.544 0.498 0 1
ISCED4it 0.0704 0.256 0 1
ISCED5it 0.0903 0.287 0 1
ISCED6it 0.227 0.419 0 1
Blue-collar workerit 0.477 0.499 0 1
White-collar workerit 0.523 0.499 0 1
Working hours 29
1)
it 0.0283 0.166 0 1
Working hours 2 ]29; 35]
1)
it 0.0849 0.279 0 1
Working hours > 35
1)
it 0.887 0.317 0 1
Regional unemployment rate growtht -0.538 1.154 0 1
Singleit 0.332 0.471 0 1
Married
2)
it 0.575 0.494 0 1
Other marital statusesit 0.0933 0.291 0 1
Year: 1999 0.0548 0.228 0 1
Year: 2001 0.0741 0.262 0 1
24Year: 2003 0.0517 0.221 0 1
Year: 2005 0.0478 0.213 0 1
Year: 2007 0.390 0.488 0 1
Year: 2009 0.381 0.486 0 1
North Germany
3)
it 0.135 0.341 0 1
East Germany
4)
it 0.274 0.446 0 1
South Germany
5)
it 0.276 0.447 0 1
West Germany
6)
it 0.316 0.465 0 1
Number of observations 7,211
Number of individuals 4,308
1) Contractual working hours.
2) Married, spouse present.
3) Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein.
4) Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt,
and Thuringia.
5) Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg.
6) Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saarland.
25Table 5: Individual random-eects ordered probit results:
Hypothesis 1.









Low positionit -0.0395 -0.149 -0.0859 -0.122
(0.157) (0.139) (0.180) (0.134)
Medium positionit -0.105 -0.177** -0.134 -0.162*
(0.101) (0.0882) (0.118) (0.0832)
Reference: High positionit
Workforceit < 20 0.449*** 0.482*** 0.456*** 0.475***
(0.0721) (0.0929) (0.0721) (0.0767)
Workforceit 2 [20; 200[ 0.144** 0.167** 0.150** 0.154**
(0.0640) (0.0738) (0.0639) (0.0643)
Workforceit 2 [200; 2000[ 0.168*** 0.176*** 0.170*** 0.167***
(0.0642) (0.0663) (0.0643) (0.0642)
Reference: Workforceit  2000
wit 0.364** 0.230 0.287 0.248*
(0.174) (0.155) (0.183) (0.128)
Additional control variables included
(see Table A.1)
Rho 0.510*** 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.511***
(0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223)
Log likelihood -8002.2467 -8002.9418 -8002.7893 -8002.7351
Number of observations 7,211
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
26Table 6: Individual random-eects ordered probit results:
Hypothesis 2.





















Low positionit 0.0495 -0.118 -0.0582 -0.166
(0.158) (0.139) (0.180) (0.135)
Medium positionit -0.0580 -0.163* -0.104 -0.174**
(0.101) (0.0883) (0.119) (0.0833)
Reference: High positionit
Workforceit < 20 0.441*** 0.500*** 0.458*** 0.476***
(0.0722) (0.0932) (0.0722) (0.0770)
Workforceit 2 [20; 200[ 0.149** 0.179** 0.154** 0.161**
(0.0641) (0.0740) (0.0641) (0.0646)
Workforceit 2 [200; 2000[ 0.173*** 0.181*** 0.168*** 0.166**
(0.0643) (0.0664) (0.0644) (0.0645)
Reference: Workforceit  2000
wit 0.471*** 0.269* 0.349* 0.246*
(0.176) (0.156) (0.185) (0.128)
Additional control variables included
(see Table A.2)
Rho 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.512*** 0.514***
(0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223)
Log likelihood -7995.7226 -8000.2204 -7999.8477 -7995.4979
Number of observations 7,211
Standard errors in parentheses.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Figures included in the text
Figure 1: Become self-employed within the next two years by wage quintiles.
30Appendix
Table A.1: Detailed individual random-eects ordered
probit results: Hypothesis 1.









Low positionit -0.0395 -0.149 -0.0859 -0.122
(0.157) (0.139) (0.180) (0.134)
Medium positionit -0.105 -0.177** -0.134 -0.162*
(0.101) (0.0882) (0.118) (0.0832)
Reference: High positionit
Workforceit < 20 0.449*** 0.482*** 0.456*** 0.475***
(0.0721) (0.0929) (0.0721) (0.0767)
Workforceit 2 [20; 200[ 0.144** 0.167** 0.150** 0.154**
(0.0640) (0.0738) (0.0639) (0.0643)
Workforceit 2 [200; 2000[ 0.168*** 0.176*** 0.170*** 0.167***
(0.0642) (0.0663) (0.0643) (0.0642)
Reference: Workforceit  2000
wit 0.364** 0.230 0.287 0.248*
(0.174) (0.155) (0.183) (0.128)
Ageit 0.0242 0.0236 0.0245 0.0243
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0226)
Age2
it -0.000692** -0.000685** -0.000698** -0.000695**
(0.000288) (0.000288) (0.000288) (0.000288)
Tenureit -0.0109 -0.0112 -0.0116 -0.0116
(0.00898) (0.00899) (0.00898) (0.00899)
Tenure2
it 1.98e-05 2.04e-05 2.97e-05 3.10e-05
(0.000306) (0.000306) (0.000306) (0.000307)
ISCED2it -0.185 -0.187 -0.188 -0.188
(0.295) (0.295) (0.295) (0.295)
ISCED3it -0.282 -0.281 -0.283 -0.283
(0.283) (0.283) (0.283) (0.284)
ISCED4it -0.0965 -0.0989 -0.0998 -0.101
31(0.296) (0.296) (0.297) (0.297)
ISCED5it 0.131 0.129 0.129 0.127
(0.294) (0.294) (0.294) (0.294)
ISCED6it 0.109 0.108 0.104 0.106
(0.292) (0.292) (0.292) (0.293)
Reference: ISCED1it
Blue-collar workerit -0.321*** -0.316*** -0.315*** -0.313***
(0.0610) (0.0610) (0.0608) (0.0608)
Reference: White-collar workerit
Working hours 29it 0.333** 0.316** 0.299** 0.300**
(0.135) (0.135) (0.133) (0.133)
Working hours 2 ]29; 35]it 0.0250 0.0230 0.0224 0.0221
(0.0816) (0.0816) (0.0816) (0.0816)
Reference: Working hours > 35it
Regional unemployment growtht 0.0437 0.0454 0.0431 0.0417
(0.0628) (0.0628) (0.0629) (0.0630)
Singleit -0.0417 -0.0420 -0.0426 -0.0432
(0.0962) (0.0963) (0.0963) (0.0963)
Marriedit 0.0206 0.0208 0.0196 0.0190
(0.0830) (0.0830) (0.0830) (0.0831)
Reference: Other marital statusesit
Annual dummy variables included
Regional dummy variables included
Rho 0.510*** 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.511***
(0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223)
Log likelihood -8002.2467 -8002.9418 -8002.7893 -8002.7351
Number of observations 7,211
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Estimated thresholds are not shown for ease of presentation. Available upon request.
Table A.2: Detailed individual random-eects ordered
probit results: Hypothesis 2.





















Low positionit 0.0495 -0.118 -0.0582 -0.166
(0.158) (0.139) (0.180) (0.135)
Medium positionit -0.0580 -0.163* -0.104 -0.174**
(0.101) (0.0883) (0.119) (0.0833)
Reference: High positionit
Workforceit < 20 0.441*** 0.500*** 0.458*** 0.476***
(0.0722) (0.0932) (0.0722) (0.0770)
Workforceit 2 [20; 200[ 0.149** 0.179** 0.154** 0.161**
(0.0641) (0.0740) (0.0641) (0.0646)
Workforceit 2 [200; 2000[ 0.173*** 0.181*** 0.168*** 0.166**
(0.0643) (0.0664) (0.0644) (0.0645)
Reference: Workforceit  2000
wit 0.471*** 0.269* 0.349* 0.246*
(0.176) (0.156) (0.185) (0.128)
Ageit 0.0284 0.0262 0.0264 0.0262
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0227)
Age2
it -0.000755*** -0.000725** -0.000727** -0.000728**
(0.000289) (0.000288) (0.000289) (0.000289)
Tenureit -0.00980 -0.0106 -0.0118 -0.0116
(0.00900) (0.00900) (0.00899) (0.00901)
Tenure2
it 1.67e-06 1.42e-05 3.72e-05 3.35e-05
(0.000306) (0.000306) (0.000307) (0.000307)
ISCED2it -0.173 -0.175 -0.193 -0.179
(0.295) (0.295) (0.295) (0.296)
ISCED3it -0.261 -0.264 -0.288 -0.275
(0.283) (0.284) (0.284) (0.284)
ISCED4it -0.0790 -0.0832 -0.106 -0.0951
(0.297) (0.297) (0.297) (0.298)
ISCED5it 0.147 0.149 0.119 0.135
(0.294) (0.294) (0.294) (0.295)
ISCED6it 0.130 0.128 0.0999 0.118
(0.292) (0.293) (0.293) (0.293)
33Reference: ISCED1it
Blue-collar workerit -0.316*** -0.311*** -0.306*** -0.299***
(0.0612) (0.0611) (0.0610) (0.0611)
Reference: White-collar workerit
Working hours 29it 0.250* 0.260* 0.221 0.176
(0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138)
Working hours 2 ]29; 35]it 0.0110 0.0175 0.0177 0.0139
(0.0818) (0.0817) (0.0817) (0.0819)
Reference: Working hours > 35it
Regional unemployment growtht 0.0531 0.0511 0.0456 0.0471
(0.0630) (0.0629) (0.0630) (0.0632)
Singleit -0.0469 -0.0460 -0.0465 -0.0490
(0.0964) (0.0964) (0.0964) (0.0967)
Marriedit 0.0138 0.0177 0.0154 0.0141
(0.0831) (0.0831) (0.0832) (0.0833)
Reference: Other marital statusesit
Annual dummy variables included
Regional dummy variables included
Rho 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.512*** 0.514***
(0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223)
Log likelihood -7995.7226 -8000.2204 -7999.8477 -7995.4979
Number of observations 7,211
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Estimated thresholds are not shown for ease of presentation. Available upon request.
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